"Clifford was famous for his public lectures on physics and math and ethics because he explained complex things with easily understood, concrete examples. As you read through his clear, simple explanations of the true bases of number, algebra and geometry you will find yourself getting angry and saying "Why the hell wasn't I taught math this way?" and "Do math ed professors know so little mathematics that they have never heard of Clifford.?" Clifford was destined to be England's Einstein until (...) his untimely death at the age of 34, just 11 days before Einstein's birth. More than 30 years before the Special Theory of Relativity was proposed he had already concluded that the force of gravity was actually due to changes in the curvature of space. He gives explanatory examples in this book that middle school children can understand."--review on Amazon.com viewed July 6, 2020. (shrink)

According to religious pluralism, the profound differences among the chief objects of adoration in the great religious traditions are largely due to the different ways in which a single transcendent reality is experienced and conceived in human life. The most prominent developer and defender of religious pluralism in the twentieth century is John Hick. Hick uses the expression ‘the Real’ to designate the transcendent reality ‘authentically experienced’ as the different gods and impersonal absolutes worshipped in the major religious traditions. A (...) central claim Hick makes is that, apart from some purely formal characteristics, the Real is ineffable in that the intrinsic properties making up its nature are beyond the scope of any human concepts. I explore this central claim and argue that it implies the dubious, if not incoherent, view that the Real in itself has neither one of many pairs of contradictory properties. (shrink)

This paper concerns the question of whether the principle of sufficient reason (every positive fact has an explanation) entails a crucial premise in the cosmological argument. The premise is: not every being can be a dependent being. (a dependent being is a being whose existence is accounted for by the causal activity of other things). It has been objected that in addition to psr we need the claim that a self-Existent being is possible. I discuss this objection and argue that (...) it is not successful. (shrink)

The issue between my view and Hasker's concerns a certain principle that he takes to be true, but I hold to be false. The principle in question asserts that failing to do better than one did is a defect only if doing the best one can is possible for one to do. I claim that this principle is false because if an all-knowing, all-powerful being were confronted with an unending series of increasingly better creatable worlds and deliberately chose to create (...) the least good world, that being would thereby show itself to be something less than a supremely perfect world-creator. In fact, I argue that if a supremely perfect world-creator were to exist and create a world, it would have to be a world than which there is no better creatable world. (shrink)

According to the Westminster Confession, “God from all eternity did... freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass. Yet... thereby neither is God the author of sin or is violence offered to the will of the creatures.” It is hard to see how these two points can be consistently maintained. Hugh McCann, however, argues that by placing God’s decisions outside of time, both propositions are perfectly consistent. I agree with McCann that God’s determining decisions do not make him the author (...) of our sins. But I think that God’s determining decisions, whether temporal or outside of time, preclude our possessing the libertarian free will that McCann’s believes we do possess. In fact, so I argue, if we possess libertarian free will, then elevating God’s determining decisions outside of time only results in God’s eternal decisions being within our power to determine. (shrink)

In this paper I wish to consider two major criticisms that have been advanced against the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God, criticisms which many philosophers regard as constituting a decisive refutation of that argument. Before stating and examining these objections it will be helpful to have before us a version of the Cosmological Argument The Cosmological Argument has two distinct parts. The first part is an argument to establish the existence of a necessary being. The second part is (...) an argument to establish that this necessary being is God. The two objections I shall consider are directed against the first part of the Cosmological Argument. Using the expression ‘dependent being’ to mean ‘a being that has the reason for its existence in the causal efficacy or nature of some other being’, and the expression ‘independent being’ to mean’ a being that has the reason for its existence within its own nature’, we may state the argument for the existence of a necessary being as follows. (shrink)

During the 19th-century controversy over human freedom, a controversy involving such figures as Locke, Collins, Clarke, Leibniz, Price, and Reid, two different conceptions of freedom were at the center of the dispute. The first of these, of which John Locke is a major advocate, I will call Lockean freedom, the other conception, of which Thomas Reid is the leading advocate, I will call Reidian freedom. The history of this controversy is fundamentally a dispute over which of these two concepts of (...) freedom is more adequate to our common-sense beliefs about freedom and our general metaphysical and scientific principles. To evaluate the merits of each side in this dispute we must, as a start, have a clear understanding of these two conceptions of freedom. Lockean freedom is fairly well understood, Reidian freedom much less so, perhaps even misunderstood. My aim in this paper is to show that the standard account of Reidian freedom is incorrect, to provide a correct interpretation of Reid’s conception of freedom, and to show its importance to the question of the connection between moral responsibility and freedom. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to criticisms of the book Can God Be Free? set forth by Bruce Russell, William Wainwright, Klaas Kraay, and Michael Almeida.

Thomas Reid developed an important theory of freedom and moral responsibility resting on the concept of agent-causation, by which he meant the power of a rational agent to cause or not cause a volition resulting in an action. He held that this power is limited in that occasions occur when one's emotions or other forces may preclude its exercise. John Martin Fischer has raised an objection – the not enough ‘Oomph’ objection – against any incompatibilist account of freedom and moral (...) responsibility. In this essay I argue that Fischer's not enough ‘Oomph’ objection fails to provide any reasons for rejecting Reid's incompatibilist, agent-causation account of freedom and moral responsibility. (shrink)

William Rowe’s a posteriori arguments for the non-existence of God are well-known. Rather less attention has been given, however, to Rowe’s intriguing a priori argument for atheism. In this paper, I examine the three published responses to Rowe’s a priori argument (due to Bruce Langtry, William Morris, and Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder, respectively). I conclude that none is decisive, but I show that Rowe’s argument nevertheless requires more defence than he provides.

Michael Bergmann and Jan Cover summarize the essence of their paper as follows: "We argue that divine responsibility is sufficient for divine thankworthiness and consistent with the absence of divine freedom. We do this while insisting on the view that both freedom and responsibility are incompatible with causal determinism." In this response I argue that while it makes sense for believers to be thankful that God exists, it makes no sense for them to thank him for doing the best act (...) he can, given the circumstances. (shrink)

Abstract‘William L. Rowe on Philosophy of Religion’ edited by Nick Trakakis, collects 30 papers of William Rowe's important work in the philosophy of religion. I review this collection, and offer an objection of one of Rowe's arguments.

In his book, Can God Be Free?, William Rowe has argued that if God is unsurpassably good He cannot be free; if He is free, He cannot be unsurpassably good. After following the discussion of this topic through a number of historical figures, Rowe focuses on the recent and contemporary debate. A key claim of Rowe's is that, if there exists an endless series of better and better creatable worlds, then the existence of a morally perfect (...) creator is impossible. I show that this argument is unsound, since a key premise can be proved false from propositions Rowe himself accepts. (shrink)

Rowe argues that if for every good world there is a better, then God is not morally perfect since no matter what world God were to create he could have done better than he did. I contend that Rowe’s argument doesn’t do justice to the role grace plays in the theist’s doctrine of creation, and respond to five new criticisms of my position that Rowe offers in Can God be Free?

Rowe argues that if for every good world there is a better, then God is not morally perfect since no matter what world God were to create he could have done better than he did. I contend that Rowe’s argument doesn’t do justice to the role grace plays in the theist’s doctrine of creation, and respond to five new criticisms of my position that Rowe offers in Can God be Free?

William L. Rowe poses a dilemma between God’s freedom and essential moral goodness by arguing that God cannot satisfy the arguably accepted condition for libertarian freedom, namely, ability to do otherwise. Accordingly, if God does a morally good action A freely, then there is at least a possible world in which God refrains from doing A and thereby does the morally wrong action. And if God does a morally wrong action in one of the possible worlds, he ceases (...) to be essentially morally perfect. I will argue that Rowe’s conclusion is based on a specific possible world semantics, and we might avoid Rowe’s conclusion with an alternative understanding of modality. In doing so, I will examine the conception of modality proposed by al-Ghaza ̄l ̄ı in which the possibility of a state of affairs does not entail its actuality in at least one possible world. (shrink)

All is set for the Greeks' departure from Troy. As I understand the scene, the rowers have their oars strapped to their hands and are eager to start. A warning flare now shines out from the regia ratis and the actual signal to start is given by a trumpet-blast, either rhetorically viewed as addressed to the thousand ships from the flagship or sounded on each at sight of the flare. The flagship then moves off and is followed by the fleet. (...) Cf. the related passage, Tro. 1044–6 ‘cum tuba iussi dare uela nautae | et simul uentis properante remo | prenderint altum’.428 laetum was conjectured by Leo in view of the difficulty of reconciling lentum, which would normally mean ‘listless’ or ‘sluggish’, and properanti in 426 ; note too 437 ff. ‘properat iuuentus omnis adductos simul | lentare remos…’ and the expression properante remo in Tro. 1045. The simple correction laetum would appear both to remove the difficulty and to be entirely appropriate. Yet, though accepted by Peiper-Richter and Herrmann, laetum has come in for resistance: it is rejected by Moricca, Viansino, Giardina, and Tarrant. In defence of lentum Viansino compares Medea 623 portibus lentis, in which I find no relevance; F. Giancotti interprets that the men in their impatience to be off appear lenti to themselves; Tarrant renders ‘slow to respond’, explaining ‘the rowing of the men is uncoordinated after ten years' lack of practice’, but in 428 the rowing has not yet started, and note the harmony indicated in 437–9. lentum is alien to Seneca's spirited picture and seems to me indefensible; laetum, on the other hand, is both attractive in itself and supported by significant evidence, which I have not seen adduced. (shrink)

All is set for the Greeks' departure from Troy. As I understand the scene, the rowers have their oars strapped to their hands and are eager to start. A warning flare now shines out from the regia ratis and the actual signal to start is given by a trumpet-blast, either rhetorically viewed as addressed to the thousand ships from the flagship or sounded on each at sight of the flare. The flagship then moves off and is followed by the fleet. (...) Cf. the related passage, Tro. 1044–6 ‘cum tuba iussi dare uela nautae | et simul uentis properante remo | prenderint altum’.428 laetum was conjectured by Leo in view of the difficulty of reconciling lentum, which would normally mean ‘listless’ or ‘sluggish’, and properanti in 426 ; note too 437 ff. ‘properat iuuentus omnis adductos simul | lentare remos…’ and the expression properante remo in Tro. 1045. The simple correction laetum would appear both to remove the difficulty and to be entirely appropriate. Yet, though accepted by Peiper-Richter and Herrmann, laetum has come in for resistance: it is rejected by Moricca, Viansino, Giardina, and Tarrant. In defence of lentum Viansino compares Medea 623 portibus lentis, in which I find no relevance; F. Giancotti interprets that the men in their impatience to be off appear lenti to themselves; Tarrant renders ‘slow to respond’, explaining ‘the rowing of the men is uncoordinated after ten years' lack of practice’, but in 428 the rowing has not yet started, and note the harmony indicated in 437–9. lentum is alien to Seneca's spirited picture and seems to me indefensible; laetum, on the other hand, is both attractive in itself and supported by significant evidence, which I have not seen adduced. (shrink)

William Rowe has put forward four popular evidential arguments from evil. I argue that there was already a prominent distinction between logical and evidential arguments from evil—the IN-IM-distinction, and that its adoption leads to two important results. First, all three non-Bayesian evidential arguments are actually not evidential but logical, while the Bayesian evidential argument genuinely evidential. Second, and most importantly, Rowe’s Bayesian evidential argument is redundant, in the sense that it has the same diculties his three non-Bayesian (...) arguments have. His move from the three earlier non-Bayesian arguments to the Bayesian argument is futile. (shrink)

While William Rowe has argued that the principle of credulity does not lend justification to religious experience, he must affirm something quite like the principle of credulity in his empirical argument from evil. To do so Rowe has proposed a modified version of the principle of credulity.I shall argue that Rowe’s modified principle of credulity creates for him a dilemma regarding the justification of belief in other minds. I further suggest it is not adequate for bridging (...) the logical gap between the existence of apparently pointless evils and the existence of genuinely pointless evil. (shrink)

Delilci kötülük argümanları, teizme karşı sunulan en güçlü argümanların başında gelmektedir. Bu argümanlar arasında gereksiz ve anlamsız kötülük türlerini merkeze alan argümanlar özellikle önemlidir. Edward H. Madden ve Peter Hare gereksiz kötülük üzerine bir argüman formüle ederken, William Rowe anlamsız kötülük üzerine argümanlar geliştirmiştir. Madden ve Hare argümanlarını altmışlarda, Rowe ise yetmişlerde öne sürmüş olsalar da İslam düşüncesinde gereksiz ve anlamsız kötülük kavramına ışık tutabilecek bir teori bulunmaktadır. Bu tür kötülükleri açıklamak için öne sürdüğüm teori, ivaz teorisidir. (...) Bu makalede ivaz teorisinin nedensiz ve anlamsız kötülükleri nasıl açıklayabileceğini inceleyeceğim. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the two most prominent recent evidential arguments from evil, due, respectively, to William Rowe and Paul Draper. I argue that neither of these evidential arguments from evil is successful, i.e. such that it ought to persuade anyone who believes in God to give up that belief. In my view, theists can rationally maintain that each of these evidential arguments from evil contains at least one false premise.

In William L. Rowe’s “The Ontological Argument,” an essay that appears in the most recent editions of Feinberg’s Reason and Responsibility and as a chapter in Rowe’s Philosophy of Religion, Rowe reconstructs Anselm’s Proslogium II argument for the existence of God, surveys critically several standard objections to it, and presents an original critique. Although Rowe’s reconstruction is perspicuous and his criticisms of the standard objections are judicious, his own critique, I argue, leaves Anselm’s argument unscathed. (...) I conclude with some programmatic remarks about what a more adequate critique of Anselm’s argument should do. (shrink)

In William L. Rowe’s “The Ontological Argument,” an essay that appears in the most recent editions of Feinberg’s Reason and Responsibility and as a chapter in Rowe’s Philosophy of Religion, Rowe reconstructs Anselm’s Proslogium II argument for the existence of God, surveys critically several standard objections to it, and presents an original critique. Although Rowe’s reconstruction is perspicuous and his criticisms of the standard objections are judicious, his own critique, I argue, leaves Anselm’s argument unscathed. (...) I conclude with some programmatic remarks about what a more adequate critique of Anselm’s argument should do. (shrink)

In this paper, I engage William Rowe’s “Friendly Atheism” to illuminate the discussion of religious disagreement. I argue that his view gives way to an epistemic principle about how two “intellectual peers” might remain steadfast in what they believe their total available evidence supports and thereby reasonably disagree about their religious beliefs. I consider a key objection from Uniqueness thesis proponents and show how there are additional epistemic considerations to help fix the proposed problem.

William Rowe has argued that if there is an infinite sequence of improving worlds then an essentially perfectly good being must actualize some world in the sequence and must not actualize any world in the sequence. Since that is impossible, there exist no perfectly good beings. I show that Rowe's argument assumes that the concept of a maximally great being is incoherent. Since we are given no reason to believe that the concept of a maximally great being (...) is incoherent we have no reason to believe Rowe's Argument from Improvability is sound. (shrink)

What might happen if business leaders across the globe viewed their work as a sacred calling in a religious sense? Might not the world be a far better place? This paper is an effort to stimulate debate and discussion on this topic. Concepts addressed include: (a) ethics in business, (b) ethical standards in business settings, (c) the role of law, (d) levels of corporate responsibility, (e) the role of religion in business ethics, (f) the idea of business as a calling (...) in a religious sense, (g) the elements of modern corporate culture, (h) creating an ethical corporate culture, (i) demonstrating corporate social responsibility, and (j) providing servant leadership. The introduction to the paper shows how these concepts interrelate; its conclusion offers a challenge to business leaders to answer their call to business in the truest sense. (shrink)

A transnational capitalist class has emerged as that segment of the world bourgeoisie that represents transnational capital, the owners of the leading worldwide means of production as embodied in the transnational corporations and private financial institutions. The spread of TNCs, the sharp increase in foreign direct investment, the proliferation of mergers and acquisitions across national borders, the rise of a global financial system, and the increased interlocking of positions within the global corporate structure, are some empirical indicators of the transnational (...) integration of capitalists. The TCC manages global rather than national circuits of accumulation. This gives it an objective class existence and identity spatially and politically in the global system above any local territories and polities. The TCC became politicized from the 1970s into the 1990s and has pursued a class project of capitalist globalization institutionalized in an emergent transnational state apparatus and in a "Third Way" political program. The emergent global capitalist historic bloc is divided over strategic issues of class rule and how to achieve regulatory order in the global economy. Contradictions within the ruling bloc open up new opportunities for emancipatory projects from global labor. (shrink)

In this paper I try to show that three of William L. Rowe’s criticisms of my book, Theism, are much less than conclusive.(1) Rowe agrees that I have established, via my defense of Descartes’s Meditation Five argument for God’s existence, that God is not a non-existing being. He denies, however, that it follows that God is an existing being. In reply, I reject the thesis that something might be neither an existing nor a non-existing object.(2) Rowe (...) maintains that the impossibility of God’s non-existence might consist simply of its being the case that no one can destroy God---a kind of impossibility which is not strong enough to sustain my (S5) modal argument for God’s existence. In reply, I argue that the impossibility of God’s non-existence must be logical.(3) Rowe maintains that it may well be that religious experiencers have experienced God without experiencing him qua maximally great being, so that religious experiences do not provide us with a reason to believe that a maximally great being is logically possible. I argue in reply that if religious experiencers do not experience God qua supremely perfect, then they have no reason to believe that they experience God. (shrink)

Skeptical theists endorse the skeptical thesis (which is consistent with the rejection of theism) that we have no good reason for thinking the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are. In his newest formulation of the evidential arguments from evil, William Rowe tries to avoid assuming the falsity of this skeptical thesis, presumably because it seems so plausible. I argue that his new argument fails to avoid doing this. Then I defend that (...) skeptical thesis against objections, thereby supporting my contention that relying on its falsity is a weakness in an argument. (shrink)

This essay explores the matter of hegemony in the global system from the standpoint of global capitalism theory, in contrast to extant approaches that analyse this phenomenon from the standpoint of the nation‐state and the inter‐state system. It advances a conception of global hegemony in transnational social terms, linking the process of globalisation to the construction of hegemonies and counter‐hegemonies in the twenty‐first century. An emergent global capitalist historical bloc, lead by a transnational capitalist class, rather than a particular nation‐state, (...) bloc of states, or region, is pursuing a hegemonic project. The US state is seen as the point of condensation for pressures from dominant groups to resolve problems of global capitalism. US‐led militarisation is a contradictory political‐military response to the crisis of global capitalism, characterised by economic stagnation, legitimacy problems and the rise of counter‐hegemonic forces. (shrink)

It is a paradox of the work of Artificial Intelligence that in order to grant consciousness to machines, the engineers first labour to subtract it from humans, as they work to foist upon philosophers a caricature of consciousness in the digital switches of weights and gates in neural nets. As the caricature goes into public circulation with the help of the media, it becomes an acceptable counterfeit currency, and the humanistic philosopher of mind soon finds himself replaced by the robotics (...) scientist. This atmospheric inversion from above to below, one in which a sky turns into the smog of a thickened air, happened once before in the world of knowledge, when Comtian positivism inspired a functionalist approach to the study of the sacred. The social scientists first said that in order to study the sacred, one had to study how it functioned in society; then having contributed to the growth of their own academic domain, they more confidently claimed that what humans worshipped with the sacred was, in fact, their own society. There simply was no such thing as God or the sacred, and so Schools of Divinity began to be eclipsed by the elevation of the new towers of the office buildings of the Social Sciences. Indeed, as I turn now away from my computer screen, I can see outside my window the William James Building of Social Relations competing for dominance of the skyline with the Victorian brick Gothic of Harvard's Memorial Hall. This clever move to eliminate the phenomenological reality of human consciousness as a prelude to the growth of a new robotics industry is a very successful scam, for it has helped enormously with the task of fund-raising for costly moon shots, such as the Japanese government's 'Fifth Generation Computer Project' which promised to create an autonomously thinking machine in the 1980s. No one seems to talk much anymore about the failure of this project, but the gurus of A.I. continue to prophesy - as Ray Kurzweil now does - that by 2030, humans will be surpassed by machines in cultural evolution. (shrink)

How did the levels of anti-Semitism in the 1930s compare to those of earlier decades? Did anti-Semitism vary in content and intensity across societies? In other words, were Germans more anti-Semitic than their European neighbors, and, if so, why? How does anti-Semitism differ from other forms of religious, racial, and ethnic prejudice? In this 2003 book, William I. Brustein offersa truly systematic comparative and empirical examination of anti-Semitism within Europe before the Holocaust. Brustein proposes that European anti-Semitism flowed from (...) religious, racial, economic, and political roots, which became enflamed by economic distress, rising Jewish immigration, and socialist success. To support his arguments, Brustein draws upon a careful and extensive examination of the annual volumes of the American Jewish Year Books and more than 40 years of newspaper reportage from Europe's major dailies. The findings of this informative book offer a fresh perspective on the roots of society's longest hatred. (shrink)

It is time for a paradigm shift in our study of world capitalism and the global ruling class. The statecentrism informing much theorization and analysis of world politics, political economy, and class structure is less and less congruent with 21st century world developments. Global capitalism represents a new stage in the ongoing and open-ended evolution of world capitalism, characterized by the rise of transnational capital and a globally integrated production and financial system commanded by a transnational capitalist class, or TCC, (...) that attempts to exercise its class power through transnational state apparatuses. The TCC, as the new global ruling class, has been attempting, albeit with limited success, to construct a global hegemonic bloc in which one group, the TCC, exercises leadership and imposes its project through the consent of those drawn into the bloc, while those from the majority who are not drawn into this hegemonic project, either through material rewards or ideological mechanisms, are contained or repressed. Global capitalism is in crisis. A popular revolt is spreading worldwide, thus posing many challenges. Transformative struggles must be informed by an accurate analysis of global capitalism and its ruling class. (shrink)

The employee owned company (EOC) might be the ideal blend of capitalism and communitarianism that vitalizes the global economy. EOCs – based on the concepts of employee participation and control – have sprung up in the United Kingdom, some parts of the European Union, the United States, Japan, and the former Eastern Bloc countries. Research has shown that they are able to compete effectively with more traditional companies. However, in addition to the pressures of business competition, EOCs face two other (...) key problems as they strive to survive: (1) degeneration and (2) human nature and the abuse of power. After introducing the idea of the EOC and describing briefly these two key problems, this article presents seven recommendations for sustaining employee owned companies. These recommendations – grounded in sound organizational theory and the writings of experts in the field of employee ownership – are offered as hypotheses to be examined empirically by future researchers. (shrink)

Drawing on the work of three prominent sociological theorists, the paper elaborates on outstanding flaws in sociological theories of action and agency. These concern a penchant for according social determinants considerably more import than intra-personal factors in explanations of action etiology. Such overly-deterministic perspectives on action, it is argued, can carry little weight in moots over moral and legal responsibility. Analytical philosophy is consulted for guidance on the task of constructing sociological theories of action properly mindful of the internal, psychological (...) realities involved in the production of actions and in the practices of responsibility attribution. (shrink)

The present collection brings together for the first time Rowe's most significant contributions to the philosophy of religion. This diverse but representative selection of Rowe's writings will provide students, professional scholars as well as general readers with stimulating and accessible discussions on such topics as the philosophical theology of Paul Tillich, the problem of evil, divine freedom, arguments for the existence of God, religious experience, life after death, and religious pluralism.

Without question “business ethics” is one of the hot topics of the day. Over the past months we have seen business after business charged with improper practices that violate commonly-accepted ethical norms. This has led to a loss of confidence in corporate management, and has had severe economic consequences. From many quarters business educators have heard the call to put more emphasis on ethical practices in their business courses and curricula. Engineering educators are also heeding this call, since the practice (...) of engineering usually involves working for (or leading) a business and/or engaging in business transactions. In the summer of 2002, Auburn University’s Engineering Professional Development program made the decision to produce—based on the author’s Executive MBA course in Business Ethics—a distance-delivered continuing education program for professional engineers and surveyors. Participants across the USA now may use the course to satisfy continuing education requirements with respect to professional licensing and certification. This paper outlines the purpose and content of the course and describes its production, distribution, application, and evaluation. (shrink)

A volume in Contemporary Human Resource Management: Issues, Challenges, and Opportunities Series Editor Ronald R. Sims, College of William and Mary The primary purpose of this book is to stimulate dialogue and discussion about the most effective ways of teaching ethics. Contributors to the book focus on approaches and methodologies and lessons learned that are having an impact in leading students to confront with accountability and understanding the bases of their ethical thinking, the responsibilities they have to an enlarged (...) base of stakeholders (whose needs and interests often are conflicting), and their stewardship to use their talents responsibility not only in fulfilling an enterprise's economic goals but also to recognize the impact of their actions on both individuals and larger society. The primary audiences for the book are those individuals responsible for teaching management, especially those with responsibilities for teaching business ethics. But the book is also designed for practicing managers, for these managers have among their most important responsibilities the development of people in their organizations who have the integrity, values, and competences to be effective managers of economic resources while at the same time to recognize the roles of their enterprise in shaping society. (shrink)

We prove that the set of all recursive functions cannot be inferred using first-order queries in the query language containing extra symbols $\lbrack +, . The proof of this theorem involves a new decidability result about Presburger arithmetic which is of independent interest. Using our machinery, we show that the set of all primitive recursive functions cannot be inferred with a bounded number of mind changes, again using queries in $\lbrack +, . Additionally, we resolve an open question in [7] (...) about passive versus active learning. (shrink)

Support from Peter J. Snow's 'Charting the Domains of Human Thought'.